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I. Appendix Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1. Flexible Specifications 
  Dep Var.: Log(Prosecuted Persons)   Share of Militia Violence 
  Militia Violence   Individual Violence   Total Violence   Militia/Total Prosecutions 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
                        
Radio Coverage, >0 - 0.2 0.107 0.107 
 
0.046 0.046 
 
0.045 0.045 
 
0.003 0.003 
  (0.097) (0.089) 
 
(0.089) (0.084) 
 
(0.085) (0.083) 
 
(0.011) (0.012) 
Radio Coverage, 0.2 - 0.4 -0.002 -0.007 
 
0.183 0.183 
 
0.175 0.175 
 
-0.010 -0.010 
  (0.126) (0.119) 
 
(0.153) (0.143) 
 
(0.151) (0.144) 
 
(0.016) (0.017) 
Radio Coverage, 0.4 - 0.6 0.071 0.054 
 
0.210 0.178 
 
0.205 0.177 
 
-0.005 -0.003 
  (0.168) (0.157) 
 
(0.168) (0.162) 
 
(0.168) (0.164) 
 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Radio Coverage, 0.6 - 0.8 0.163 0.229 
 
0.153 0.186 
 
0.161 0.195 
 
0.007 0.010 
  (0.177) (0.166) 
 
(0.162) (0.155) 
 
(0.160) (0.153) 
 
(0.020) (0.021) 
Radio Coverage, 0.8 - 1 0.687** 0.608** 
 
0.218 0.109 
 
0.311 0.206 
 
0.072** 0.076** 
  (0.241) (0.251) 
 
(0.188) (0.162) 
 
(0.170)* (0.146) 
 
(0.034) (0.034) 
                        
Observations 1065 1065  1065 1065  1065 1065  1,045 1,045 R-squared 0.530 0.551  0.627 0.648  0.638 0.657  0.252 0.258 Commune FE Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Propagation Controls Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y Additional Controls N Y  N Y  N Y  N Y Note: Radio Coverage is the share of the village area that has RTLM radio reception. The radio propagation controls are: latitude, longitude, and second-order polynomials in 
village mean altitude, village altitude variance, distance to the nearest RTLM transmitter. Additional controls are the logs of population, population density, distance to nearest 
major town, distance to nearest major road, distance to the border; and slope dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for spatial correlation (Conley, 1999). 
 
 
 
Table A.2. District-Clustered Standard Errors. 
  Dependent Variable: Log(Prosecuted Persons) 
  Militia Violence   Individual Violence   Total Violence 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
                        
Radio Coverage in Village 0.54** 0.50** -10.2**   0.42* 0.44* -2.69   0.48** 0.49** -4.46 
  (0.23) (0.24) (3.80)   (0.23) (0.24) (3.81)   (0.22) (0.24) (3.30) 
Radio Coverage in Nearby Villages   
  
2.04**       0.35       0.55   
     , within 10 km   (0.87)       (0.67)       (0.72)   
Radio Coverage in Nearby Villages   -0.28       -0.17       -0.20   
     , within 10-20 km   (0.91)       (1.01)       (0.93)   
Radio Coverage * % Hutu with Primary Education     -0.086       -0.081*       -0.082** 
      (0.072)       (0.044)       (0.040) 
Radio Coverage * % Hutu with Cement Floor     -0.009       0.085*       0.070* 
      (0.065)       (0.042)       (0.041) 
Radio Coverage * Size of Tutsi Minority     0.059       -0.253**       -0.211* 
      (0.161)       (0.122)       (0.104) 
                        
Observations 1065 1065 1065   1065 1065 1065   1065 1065 1065 
Commune FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Propagation Controls Y Y Y   Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Propagation Controls, Nearby Villages <10 km N Y N   N Y N   N Y N 
Additional Controls Y Y Y   Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Additional Interaction Controls N N Y   N N Y   N N Y 
Note: The control variables have the same definitions as in previous tables. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the district level. There are 26 districts 
in the sample. Significance levels at *10%, **5%, ***1%.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3. The Effects of RTLM on Mortality, Household Survey Data  
  Dependent Variable: Share of Descendants Reported Dead by Mothers 
  All Children   Males   Females 
  All Households 
All 
Households 
All 
Households 
All 
Households 
Lived in 
village in 
1994 
Lived 
elsewhere 
in 1994 
  All Households 
Lived in 
village in 
1994 
  All Households 
Lived in 
village in 
1994 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
                          
Radio Coverage in Village    0.077**   0.086**    0.089***    0.085***    0.078** -0.051      0.152*** 
    
0.155***   0.014 -0.007 
  (0.031) (0.033) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.193)   (0.036) (0.038)   (0.056) (0.055) 
Number of Male Children          0.026***    0.025***    0.033***      0.023*** 
   
0.022***      0.021*** 
   
0.022*** 
        (0.003) (0.003) (0.012)   (0.003) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.005) 
Number of Female Children           0.016*** 
     
0.016***    0.028**   
      
0.024*** 
   
0.025***      0.017*** 
   
0.016*** 
        (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)   (0.004) (0.005)   (0.005) (0.005) 
                          
Observations 2394 2394 2394 2394 2085 309   2178 1907   2166 1912 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.40   0.13 0.13   0.11 0.12 
Commune FE Y Y Y Y Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
Propagation Controls N Y Y Y Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
Additional Controls N N Y Y Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
Dependent Variable Mean 0.215 0.215 0.215 0.215 0.222 0.170   0.244 0.252   0.200 0.204 
Notes: Data from the 2000 EICV national household survey. The unit of observation is a household. The dependent variable is the share of children reported to have died, as 
reported by mothers of age 20 and above at the time of the genocide. In columns (1)-(6) the share is for children of both gender. In columns (7)-(8) it is the share of male children, 
and in columns (9)-(10) it is the share of female children. In column (5) the sample is restricted to households that lived in the village at the time of the genocide, and in column (6) 
it is restricted to households that did not. There are 332 villages in the full sample. Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for spatial correlation (Conley, 1999).  Significance 
levels at *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4. Outcomes in Levels and Dropping of Outliers 
  Total Violence   Militia Violence   Individual Violence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (7) (6) (8)   (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                              
  Panel A: Prosecuted Persons 
                              
Radio Coverage in Village 62.4 
  
85.0** 60.4 74.3**    28.0** 14.9* 28.1** 16.7**   34.4 54.1 32.3 43.8 
  (42.0) (35.3) (42.2) (33.5)   (11.1) (8.41) (11.6) (8.17)   (36.7) (31.0) (37.4) (30.1) 
                              
                              
  Panel B: Log(Prosecuted Persons) 
                              
Radio Coverage in Village 
  
0.53** 0.55** 
  
0.48** 0.49**   
  
0.56*** 0.48** 
  
0.54*** 0.49**    0.46* 0.49**  0.42* 0.43* 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23)   (0.22) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21)   (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
                              
                              
Observations 1065 1054 1065 1054   1065 1054 1065 1054   1065 1054 1065 1054 
Commune FE Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y 
Propagation Controls Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y 
Excluding Top 1% Violence N Y N Y   N Y N Y   N Y N Y 
Additional Controls N N Y Y   N N Y Y   N N Y Y 
Dep. Var. Mean, Levels 388.4 372.7 388.4 372.7   58.8 54.9 58.8 54.9   329.7 315.7 329.7 315.7 
Notes: In Panel A the dependent variable is the number of prosecuted persons in levels, while in Panel B it is the natural logarithm of the number of 
persons. The variables, sample and controls are defined as before. Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for spatial correlation (Conley, 1999).  
Significance levels at *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.5. Heterogeneous Effects of RTLM on Participation in the Genocide            
  Dependent Variable: Log(Prosecuted Persons) 
  Total Violence   Militia Violence   Individual Violence 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
        !!       !!       
Radio Coverage * % Literate Hutu    -0.121** -0.120** -0.098* !!   -0.117** -0.097 -0.104      -0.119** -0.122* -0.095* 
  (0.054) (0.058) (0.051)   (0.057) (0.060) (0.068)   (0.056) (0.062) (0.053) 
                        
Radio Coverage * % Hutu with Cement Floor 0.063** 0.056 0.090** 
!
0.069* 0.025 0.013 
 
0.058* 0.063 0.105** 
  (0.032) (0.042) (0.045)   (0.041) (0.047) (0.051)   (0.032) (0.046) (0.050) 
Radio Coverage 0.519** -5.829* -4.429 
!
0.564*** -9.73*** -10.2*** 
 
0.461* -4.348 -2.653 
  (0.264) (3.300) (3.230)   (0.212) (3.25) (3.31)   (0.278) (4.003) (3.974) 
Radio Coverage * Size of Tutsi Minority 
  
-0.203** 
   
0.068 
   
-0.246** 
      (0.091)       (0.156)       (0.108) 
                        
Observations 1065 1061 1061   1065 1061 1061   1065 1061 1061 
R-squared 0.66 0.66 0.66   0.55 0.55 0.55   0.65 0.65 0.65 
Additional Controls Y Y Y   Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Additional Interaction Controls N Y Y   N Y Y   N Y Y 
Note: All regressions include commune fixed effects and propagation controls, and all controls are defined as before. % Literate Hutu is the percentage of Hutu household heads 
in the commune that are literate in 1991. All other variables are defined the same as in Table 7. Standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for spatial correlation (Conley, 1999). 
Significance levels at *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
II. Appendix Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1. The Topography of Rwanda 
Source: Shuttle Radar Topography Mission 
 
 
 
Figure A.2. Predicted Radio Coverage, 4 communes example 
This left picture shows the height of ground, where brighter marks higher altitude. The right 
picture shows the empirical radio coverage, where grey marks radio coverage. The signal 
comes from the Mount Muhe transmitter located 30 km to the west (outside the figure). The 
figures show that within each commune (boundaries in thick white lines), villages 
(boundaries in thin white lines) to the east of hilltops have low radio coverage due the 
hilltops in the line-of-sight to the transmitter. In this example, the variation comes from the 
east-west relationship to the hilltops. In other communes it will, of course, function in other 
directions. In Table 2 we also show that the slope of the village is uncorrelated with radio 
coverage. Source: SRTM 90m topography data, author’s calculations of radio coverage in 
ArcGIS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3. Robustness Tests. Distribution of point estimates from 26 regressions of direct effects (Table 3, 
specifications 4 and 8) and cross-village spillover effects (Table 5, specifications 2 and 4), where each 
regression drops one of the 26 districts from the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure A.4. Aggregate Effects. The graphs plot the distributions of the estimated 
counterfactual violence under the assumption that RTLM did not broadcast. The vertical 
lines in red represent the actual number of prosecuted persons. The upper figure presents 
the counterfactual distribution for militia violence, and includes the distribution when 
spillover effects are ignored. The middle figure is for individual violence. As there is no 
evidence of spillovers for individual violence, the counterfactual estimates are only due 
to direct effects. The bottom graph is for total violence. Table 6 provides the summary 
statistics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.5. Graphical example of information and coordination effects of mass media.  
The graph plots the equilibrium participation as a function of the share of the population receiving 
the propaganda, and is based on numerical solutions under different parameter values. The thick 
dashed black line is the predicted effect on individual violence (no strategic complementarities) 
under a relatively high cost of violence, where the information effect is essentially zero, while the 
solid red line shows the predicted effect on militia violence (strategic complementarities) under 
otherwise identical parameter values. The difference captures the coordination effect and increasing 
returns to scale of propaganda, as well as the implication that the composition of violence (share of 
violence with strategic complementarities). The thin dashed grey line shows the effect on individual 
violence the cost is relatively low, but with otherwise identical parameter values as the dashed black 
line. In this case, participation increases solely due to information effects from the content of the 
broadcasts. 
 
III. A Model of Propaganda and Political Mass Violence
David Yanagizawa-Drott
Abstract
A government with a genocide agenda can use mass media to disseminate its policy
regarding civilian violence against a minority group, by broadcasting information that
such violence is state-sponsored where the costs of participation (non-participation)
are relatively low (high). Some ethnic majority individuals exogenously receive the
broadcasts and use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs about the government’s policy,
as well as beliefs about how many co-ethnics that will participate in the violence. The
share of the population that receive the broadcasts is common knowledge. The unique
equilibrium shows that propaganda has the potential to increase civilian participation
in violence via two channels: (1) by informing citizens about the costs and benefits
of violence, and; (2) by facilitating coordination when there are strategic complemen-
tarities in violence. In the latter case, propaganda will exhibit positive spillovers with
increasing returns to scale.
1 Basic Setup
To analyze how propaganda broadcast via mass media can affect conflict, the paper first
sets up a parsimonious model of participation in mass violence. Albeit relatively simple, the
model sheds light on some channels through which exposure to propaganda can translate
into increased violence.
The model considers a situation in which there are two ethnic groups. Individuals in
the majority group face the choice of participating in an attack against the minority group;
the government’s de facto policy on punishment (or reward) for such violence is uncertain;
citizens have heterogenous priors, and; some exogenous fraction receives information about
the policy through mass media. The model is micro-founded, focuses on local violence, and
allows for strategic complementarities in the organization of violence. The model will focus
1
on two distinct types of violence: militia violence, where strategic complementarities play
a role, and individual violence, where the payoff of conflict does not depend on whether
others participate in the attack. By explaining macro (group) behavior based on individual
decision-making, the model will deviate from typical conflict models that analyze group-level
optimization while assuming away coordination issues within groups.1
The model employs the static global game structure developed by Carlsson and van
Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998, 2005), which enables a unique equilibrium and
the derivation of testable predictions.
1.1 Preferences
Consider an area with a continuum of citizens. In principle, the area could be a country,
region, or a village (in this section, we use the term village). Each citizen is a member
of one of two ethnic groups, ethnic majority group H and ethnic minority group T . The
population size of group H is normalized to 1, and the size of group T in each village is δ.
The analysis focuses on the discrete decision by group H members to participate in an attack
against minority group T in the village. In order to keep things simple, strategic behavior by
minority group members is not studied. Instead, we assume that an exogeneous fraction δ of
the minority group defends themselves in case of an attack, so that the size of the defending
group is t¯ = δt.2 In what follows, we exclusively focus on the behavior of group H members.
Let the payoffs be
u =
{
π + θ + αh
t¯
if the member participates in the attack
0 if the member does not participate in the attack
The payoff from participating in the attack has an exogenous private benefit π. This
could reflect the monetary value of resources (e.g., land or other property) that is taken from
group T citizens in an attack, independently of the number of participants in the attack.
Violence against minority citizens is potentially illegal and associated with punishment by
the government. The parameter θ captures the punishment cost when the government can
1By incorporating strategic complementarities, the model deviates from the contest model - the workhorse
model of conflict studies - which assumes away collective action issues within groups (e.g., Haavelmo, 1954;
Hirshleifer, 1989).
2In standard conflict models, the analysis takes place at the group level where coordination within groups
is assumed away. For a framework of how relative sizes of ethnic groups affect conflict, see Esteban and Ray
(2008).
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verify that an individual has participated in a violent attack. In democracies, we would
expect a large negative value to reflect the strong protection of civil rights.3 The stronger
the protection, the more negative θ will be. By contrast, a positive value of θ would reflect
that violence is heavily state-sponsored.4 The de facto subsidy can come in many forms,
such as through the provision of firearms, equipment, or training.
Importantly, we allow the payoff from participation in violence to depend on the total
number of participants in the attack, relative to how many individuals defend themselves,
h
t¯
. That is, we allow strategic complementarities in violence, α ≥ 0.5 There are multiple
reasons for α to be strictly positive. For example, a positive α could reflect that it requires
a certain number of individuals to make a militia group functional. There could be safety
in numbers if attacking in numbers decreases the likelihood of one being injured or killed.6
To get a convenient formalization of these potential factors, we let the payoff structure be
linear in h
t¯
.
We are interested in the equilibrium number of ethnic majority members participating
in the violence, h, and how this can be affected by broadcasting propaganda. To focus on
the interesting aspects of such broadcasts, we simplify by assuming that the private value of
π is zero.7
1.2 Information and beliefs
In situations of ethnic conflict and civil unrest, political factions compete for power. This
is often associated with uncertainty regarding the government’s policy. In this context, the
extent to which citizens will be punished or rewarded for participating in ethnic violence is
often unclear. We formalize this by assuming that there is incomplete information about θ.
3In the spirit of Becker’s (1968) model of crime and punishment, θ may be broken down into two factors
consisting of the product of the probability of being caught by the government, and the punishment con-
ditional on being caught. Disentangling the two factors empirically is not feasible, given the data in this
paper, and we therefore lump them together.
4Note that this is equivalent to punishment for not participating in the violence. This was, for example,
very common during the Rwandan Genocide. Hutus who did not want to participate in the killings often had
to pay fines to officials and organizers (Hatzfeld, 2005). Soldiers and police would also threaten to punish
Hutus who wanted only to pillage and not to harm the Tutsis (Des Forges, 1999).
5One could also, in principle, allow for strategic substitutes such that members are less willing to par-
ticipate if others are participating. It is worth noting that the empirical results that will follow are largely
inconsistent with strategic substitutes (derivations and predictions not shown, but are available upon re-
quest).
6Additional reasons for a positive α could be different sources of interpersonal phenomena documented
in social psychology and sociology. These include a desire to conform, peer pressure, and group think.
7This is not an important assumption, but it simplifies the math. It can easily be relaxed without changing
any of the results, since a positive value of π would simply lead to a larger baseline aggregate violence h in
the absence of propaganda.
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In this section, we describe how members form their beliefs about θ.
In line with the literature on global games, members do not observe θ but receive informa-
tion about its value, and thus form beliefs. We make the standard assumption that members
have a diffuse prior distribution of θ on the real line. Each member i observes an independent
private signal xi = θ + εi, where εi is independently and normally distributed with mean
zero and variance σ2x. We can consider xi as all of the independent private information that
a certain member has acquired from different sources.
Now, suppose there is a mass media outlet that broadcasts information about the gov-
ernment’s policy position. Given the empirical setting in this paper, let the outlet be a
radio station. The station broadcasts a signal p about the value of θ. A fraction r of the
village population receives the signal p. For simplicity, we do not consider strategic behavior
on behalf of whoever sends out the signal. Instead, agents correctly view the signal p as
informative about an underlying policy, θ. The signal has the structure p = θ + b. To keep
the analysis simple, we assume that b is exogenous, unobservable, and distributed normally
with mean zero and variance σ2p.
8
Key to the model is that p is a public signal among members with access to the broadcasts,
i.e., there is common knowledge about the radio signal among ethnic majority group members
with means of accessing a radio. Therefore, a member with radio access will not only use
the signal to update his own belief about θ, but will also know that a fraction r of the other
village members listen to the radio and receive signal p, and everybody with radio knows
that everybody else with radio knows this, and so on. Individuals without radio access do
not receive the public signal. In order to focus on the choices of majority members who
receive the radio broadcasts, and to keep the analysis tractable, we make the simplifying
assumption that members without radio are unaware of others receiving the radio signal.
Individuals use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs about the government’s policy. For
members without radio, the posterior distribution for member i who receives private signal
xi is normally distributed with mean θ¯
N
i = xi and variance σ
2
x. For members with radio,
the posterior expectation of θ given public information alone is normal with mean θ¯Ri =(
σ2xp+ σ
2
yxi
)
/
(
σ2p + σ
2
x
)
.9
8The key assumption about p is that σ2p is finite, so that the broadcasts are informative. The zero mean
is not a binding assumption, since one can easily add a known constant to shift the distribution. If the radio
signal is biased on average, individuals will adjust for this when they form beliefs about θ. Treating the
signal as exogenous and without manipulation may be unrealistic. For a model with endogenous information
manipulation in a civil war context, see Edmond (2013).
9The posterior variance is
σ2xσ
2
p
σ2x+σ
2
p
.
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1.3 Equilibrium
We are interested in the equilibrium level of participation in violent behavior, h. Consider a
strategy where each member follows a simple switching rule
a(θ¯ji ) =
{
participate if θ¯ji ≥ κj
do not participate if θ¯ji < κ
j
where j = N labels the strategy for members without radio and j = R for members with
radio. That is, members participate if their beliefs about the government’s punshment cost
(reward) is sufficiently low (high), i.e., θ¯ji is above some threshold κ
j. Following Morris and
Shin (1998, 2005), this strategy is unique under some regularity conditions (see the online
appendix for the regularity conditions and the derivation of the equilibrium). Therefore,
there is a unique equilibrium cutoff for members with radio (κR) and those without radio
(κN), defined by the expectation of government policy that makes an individual indifferent
regarding the choice of attacking the ethnic minority group or not doing so.
For an individual with radio access, the threshold κR depends on how many members
of the ethnic majority group also have access to the broadcast, κR(r). When r is low, an
individual gathers that not many others have received p. When r is high, however, the
individual knows that most members have also received p. This can dramatically change
the individual’s expectations regarding how others will behave, and can change his own
willingness to participate. Therefore, the fraction of the population with radio coverage, r,
is a key variable for the equilibrium participation in violence.
1.4 Predictions
Having pinned down the equilibrium thresholds, κN and κR, we can derive the equilibrium
participation, h. See the appendix for the derivation. Given a government policy θ and
some signal p, we can calculate the participation rate among those unable to receive the
broadcasts (the share with beliefs θ¯Ni ≥ κN), and the participation rate among the population
receiving the broadcasts (the share with beliefs θ¯Ri ≥ κR). The weighted average gives us
the participation rate as a function of the population exposed to the propaganda. We are
now ready to state the main results.
Lemma 1 When the propaganda transmits the signal that violence against the minority
group is state-sponsored (i.e., the cost θ is sufficiently low), participation in violence increases
in the population with access to the media broadcasts (If p > p˜ ≡ − α
2t¯
, then ∂h/∂r > 0).
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The logic behind Lemma 1 is relatively intuitive. A formal proof is provided in section
2 below. Let propaganda be defined as a signal that the government encourages violence
against the minority, p > p˜. Since this is informative, people receiving the propaganda update
their beliefs about the government. When the updated belief increases the expected value of
participation for the average member, which is the case when p > p˜, this will in turn increase
the likelihood that an individual will participate.10
Militia Violence and Individual Violence
In principle, different forms of violence can be defined along the continuum of strategic
complementarities, α. To focus on the key distinction, however, assume that there are two
forms: militia, where strategic complementarities are present (α > 0); and individual, where
the benefit of violence does not depend on whether others are violent (α = 0). The total
violence h can therefore be broken down into two parts, where the population share for each
type of violence is hv, and where v ∈ {c, i}. Further, assume that the pool of eligible recruits
for the two forms of violence are separable: γ share of the population are eligible recruits for
militia violence, and 1 − γ can potentially join the individual violence. The motivation for
this separability is that individuals who are marginal recruits for militia violence in practice
are often physically capable young men, whereas women and older men are typically not
eligible, willing, or marginal. Separability also simplifies the analysis.
Proposition 1 If the condition in Lemma 1 is satisfied, then there are increasing scale
effects for militia violence (hc), but not individual violence (hi): ∂
2hc/∂r
2 ≥ 0, ∂2hi/∂r2 = 0,
∂hi/∂r = c¯ ≥ 0.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows (see section 2 for the formal proof).
When there are no strategic complementarities, the individual decision to participate does
not depend on the total number of participants. In this case, propaganda broadcasts only
affect participation through beliefs about the government’s policy. As the population with
access to the broadcasts increases, the first (non-strategic) effect implies that more members
will hold beliefs about the government’s policy above the participation threshold. This effect
on beliefs increases participation. As the fraction holding positive expectations of the value
10Note that this result implies that an average p will not necessarily increase violence. However, the result
is equivalent to an alternative model where where the private signal xi reflects heterogenous priors, θ is
drawn randomly, and p is symmetrically distributed around θ. Since mass media is not manipulated, what
the broadcasts do is simply provide information that the government exercises a repressive policy against
the minority group.
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of conflict is constant within the population exposed to the propaganda, the effects are linear
in the population exposed. This is the direct information effect.
Under strategic complements, there is an additional mechanism in play. Strategic com-
plements imply that individuals are more willing to join the militia violence when many
others also join. As more individuals are exposed to the propaganda, the direct information
effect implies that a larger number are likely to participate in the violence. Expecting a
higher participation rate, each individual exposed to the propaganda is consequently more
willing to also participate (since the participation threshold is now lower). Therefore, pro-
paganda can lead to an indirect coordination effect that stimulates participation in militia
violence. The implication is that propaganda can cause some individuals to participate in
militia violence, but not individual violence, simply because their peers are expected to par-
ticipate (and will do so in equilibrium). Because of these social interactions, mass media
lead to positive spillover effects across individuals in the village. Since the marginal effect
is increasing in the share of the population exposed, the indirect effect gives rise to a non-
linear, increasing scale effect in the case of militia violence.11 If complements in violence are
strong (α is positive and large), the coordination effect is a potentially important mechanism
whereby propaganda affects behavior.
To see how propaganda can lead to information and coordination effects, Figure A.5 in
the appendix plots the predicted effect under parameterized versions of the model where the
condition in Lemma 1 is fulfilled. To highlight the coordination effect, the parameter values
are first set such that average prior beliefs (i.e., without receiving p) about the punishment
costs (θ) are high, so that the information effect of radio coverage is negligible. The effect
on individual violence is therefore practically zero (dashed black line). By contrast, ceteris
paribus, militia violence can increase substantially once a critical mass has access to the
broadcast. This is simply due to some individuals joining because they believe others will
join - i.e. the coordination effect. Furthermore, since the cost of individual violence can differ
from that of militia violence, the grey dashed line shows how individual violence is affected
when θ is low, ceteris paribus. In this case, baseline violence in the absence of mass media
is higher and violence increases in the size of the population exposed to the propaganda.12
11In the model, the scale effect arises because of coordination. It is worth noting that the scale effects can
arise under a broader class of models with complements and peer effects when there exists no coordination
problem. This possibility is important to keep in mind when interpreting the empirical results. For a
discussion of scale effects in other contexts, see Glaeser et al.’s paper on the “social multiplier” (2005).
12The strategic complementarity parameter for militia violence is α = 0.05. The other parameter values
are: π = 0, p = 0.5, θ = −0.5 for high cost, and θ = −0.1 for low cost, and the variances of private
information (σx = 0.05) and public information (σp = 0.15) are set such that the conditions for a unique
equilibrium are satisfied.
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This effect, however, is linear. Since militia violence is non-linear, the example demonstrates
that the composition of violence can be affected, as share of the violence that is militia can
increase substantially when a critical mass has access to the broadcasts, even if baseline
individual violence is higher in the absence of mass media.
2 Proofs
2.1 Uniqueness
Members without access to the propaganda
For members without access to the propaganda, we can directly use the Morris and Shin
(1998) uniqueness result under private signal only. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium threshold
κN is pinned down by setting participation utility u(θ¯Ni = κ
N) = 0. This is equal to
κN = − α
2t
. (1)
Members with access to the propaganda
Members with access to the public propaganda signal take the threshold of equation (1) as
given. The equilibrium participation threshold κR is the solution to the equilibrium condition
κR +
α
t
[
rΦ
(
σ2x(p− κR)
σ2pγ
)
+ (1− r) Φ
( α
2t
+ κR
γ
)]
= 0, (2)
where γ ≡ (2σ2xσ2p+σ4x)1/2(σ2x+σ2p)−1/2 and Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution
function. The two terms within the curly brackets capture the expected participation rate,
for a member exposed to the propaganda with an expectation about the government’s policy
equal to: θ¯Ri = κ
R. The first term is equal to the expected participation rate among those
that receive the propaganda, and the second term is the expected participation rate among
those that do not receive the propaganda.
Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique under the regularity condition
σ2x/σ
2
pγ ≤
√
2πt/α,
where γ ≡
√(
2σ2xσ
2
p + σ
4
x
)
/(σ2x + σ
2
p). This is the Morris and Shin (1998) uniqueness result
under a public signal, with the distinction that only some proportion r of the players receive
the public signal. Morris and Shin prove uniqueness when everybody receives a public signal
by iterative deletion of strictly dominated interim strategies, which can equally be applied
8
in this context. Here, we show a sketch of the proof, essentially following Morris and Shin
(2001).
Define f(r, κR) as the left hand side function of the equation (2). A sufficient condition
for a unique solution is that the left hand side increases weakly monotonically in κR, f ′κR ≥ 0.
The uniqueness condition is therefore that the derivative with respect to κR is non-negative
(the monotonicity condition),
f ′κR = 1 +
α
t
(
−rϕ
(
σ2x(p− κR)
σ2pγ
)
σ2x
σ2pγ
+
α
tγ
(1− r)ϕ
( α
2t
+ κR
γ
))
≥ 0,
where ϕ is the standard normal density function. We see that the function reaches its lowest
value when r = 1. Substituting for r = 1 and rearranging gives
1 ≥ α
t
ϕ
[
σ2x(p− κR)
σ2pγ
]
σ2x
σ2pγ
.
The density of the standard normal ϕ(·) reaches its maximum value of 1/√2π when the
argument of ϕ(·) is zero. Substituting ϕ(·) with 1/√2π then gives the sufficient condition
for a unique solution
σ2x
σ2pγ
≤
√
2πt
α
. (3)
2.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Given a government policy θ, we can calculate the proportion of members with beliefs θ¯Ni ≥
κN , given equation (1), and the proportion of radio members with beliefs θ¯Ri ≥ κR, given
equation (2). Using the distributions for the private signals and the propaganda signal,
conditional on θ, the participation rate is a function of the population with access to the
propaganda
h = rhR + (1− r)hN , (4)
where hR is participation rate among the member exposed to the propaganda, and hN is the
participation rate among the non-exposed. In equilibrium,
hN = Φ
[( α
2t
+ θ
)
/σx
]
. (5)
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and
hR = Φ
[(
σ2x
σ2p
p+ θ − σ
2
x + σ
2
p
σ2p
κR
)
/σx
]
, (6)
Taking the derivative of h with respect to r in equation (4) gives
∂h
∂r
= hR − hN + r∂h
R
∂r
, (7)
since hN is independent of r.
We will show that the sufficient condition for ∂h
∂r
≥ 0 is p ≥ − α
2t
. By equation (7), ∂h
∂r
≥ 0
if hR ≥ hN and ∂hR
∂r
≥ 0. We first derive the condition for hR ≥ hN to be fulfilled.
hR ≥ hN
⇐⇒
Φ
[(
σ2x
σ2p
p+ θ − σ
2
x + σ
2
p
σ2p
κR
)
/σx
]
≥ Φ
[( α
2t
+ θ
)
/σx
]
⇐⇒
σ2x
σ2p
p+ θ − σ
2
x + σ
2
p
σ2p
κR ≥ α
2t
+ θ
⇐⇒
p ≥ σ
2
p
σ2x
[
α
2t
+
σ2x + σ
2
p
σ2p
κR
]
.
This is also the sufficient condition for ∂h
R
∂r
≥ 0. To see this, take the derivative
∂hR
∂r
= −ϕ
[(
σ2x
σ2p
p+ θ − σ
2
x + σ
2
p
σ2p
κR
)
/σx
]
σ2x + σ
2
p
σ2p
∂κR
∂r
,
which is weakly positive if ∂κR/∂r ≤ 0. From equation (2) we use the implicit function
theorem and take the total derivative
∂κR
∂r
= − f
′
r
f ′
κR
Since by the monotonicity assumption we have that f ′κR ≥ 0 , we have to show that
f ′r =
α
t
(
Φ
[
σ2x(p− κR)
σ2pγ
]
− Φ
[ α
2t
+ κR
γ
])
≥ 0.
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Applying the sufficient condition for hR ≥ hN , we let p = σ2p
σ2x
[
α
2t
+
σ2x+σ
2
p
σ2p
κR
]
+ ε, where ε is
a small positive number. This gives us
f ′r =
α
t
Φ
σ2x(σ2pσ2x
[
α
2t
+
σ2x+σ
2
p
σ2p
κR
]
+ ε− κR)
σ2pγ
− Φ [ α2t + κR
γ
]
=
α
t
Φ
 α2t + κR + σ2xσ2p ε√
2σ2xσ
2
p+σ
4
x
σ2x+σ
2
p
− Φ
 α2t + κR√
2σ2xσ
2
p+σ
4
x
σ2x+σ
2
p

≥ 0
Together with the uniqueness condition (3), p ≥ σ2p
σ2x
[
α
2t
+
σ2x+σ
2
p
σ2p
κR
]
therefore implies
∂κR
∂r
≤ 0 (8)
with equality if α = 0, and strict inequality if α > 0.
We now show that p ≥ − α
2t
implies that the condition p ≥ σ2p
σ2x
[
α
2t
+
σ2x+σ
2
p
σ2p
κR
]
is fulfilled for
all values of r. Since ∂κ
R
∂r
≤ 0, the maximum value of κR is achieved when r = 0. Substituting
for r = 0 in the equilibrium condition (2), we get
κR +
α
t
Φ
 α2t + κR√
2σ2xσ
2
p+σ
4
x
σ2x+σ
2
p
 = 0
The equilibrium condition is fulfilled only when κR = − α
2t
, since substituting κR = − α
2t
gives
− α
2t
+
α
t
Φ
 α2t − α2t√
2σ2xσ
2
p+σ
4
x
σ2x+σ
2
p

= − α
2t
+
α
t
Φ [0]
= − α
2t
+
α
2t
= 0
The maximum value of κR is therefore − α
2t
, which is when r = 0. Substituting for the
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maximum value of κR, the sufficient condition for ∂h
∂r
≥ 0 is
p ≥ σ
2
p
σ2x
[
α
2t
+
σ2x + σ
2
p
σ2p
(
− α
2t
)]
= − α
2t
≡ p˜.
2.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Since militia violence and individual violence are separable, the following proof will hold for
any γ and one only needs to show that the comparative statics hold for violence when α = 0
and α > 0, respectively.
Recall that ∂h
∂r
= hR − hN + r ∂hR
∂r
. When α = 0, the equilibrium conditions imply that
κN = κR = 0, for all r. Using (8), this implies that ∂h
R
∂r
= 0. Furthermore, if the condition
of Lemma 1 is satisfied (p ≥ 0), then ∂h/∂r = hR − hN = c¯ ≥ 0, where c¯ is a constant
independent of r. To see this,
hR − hN =
Φ
 σ2xσ2p p+ θ
σx
− Φ [ θ
σx
]
=
= c¯ > 0.
Therefore, under no strategic complements (α = 0), the participation rate increases
linearly in the population exposed. What is left is to show is that scale effects occur when
the condition in Lemma 1 is fulfilled and α > 0.
Take the second derivative of h w.r.t. r in equation 7 gives
∂2h
∂r2
=
σ2x + σ
2
p
σ2p
ϕ(z)
[
−2∂κ
R
∂r
− r
[
z
σ2x + σ
2
p
σ2p
(
∂κR
∂r
)2
+
∂2κR
∂r2
]]
(9)
, where z ≡
σ2x
σ2p
p+θ−σ
2
x+σ
2
p
σ2p
κR
σx
. It can be shown that equation 9 implies that ∂
2h
∂r2
> 0 for all r as
long as less than half of the majority population participates (hR < 1/2). However, to prove
existence of scale effects, the easiest approach is the following: Let α > 0. At r = 0, using
(8), ∂
2h
∂r2
= −2∂κR
∂r
σ2x+σ
2
p
σ2p
ϕ(z) > 0. Q.E.D.
12
3 References
Becker, Gary S., “Crime and punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political
Economy, 76 (1968), 169-217.
Carlsson, Hans, and Eric van Damme, “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,” Econo-
metrica, 61 (1993), 989-1018.
Des Forges, Alison, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, (New York: Human
Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, 1999).
Edmond, Chris, “Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime Change,” The Re-
view of Economic Studies, 80 (2013), 1422-1458.
Esteban, Joan, and Debraj Ray,“Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict,” Journal of
Peace Research, 45 (2008), 163-182.
Haavelmo, Trygve, A Study in the Theory of Economic Evolution, (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1954).
Hatzfeld, Jean, Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak, (Macmillan, 2005).
Hirshleifer, Jack, “Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs. Difference Mod-
els of Relative Success,” Public Choice, 63 (1989), 101-112.
Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Song Shin, “Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling
Currency Attacks,” American Economic Review, 88 (1998), 587-97.
———–, “Notes on Strategic Substitutes and Complements in Global Games,” Princeton
University. Unpublished paper (2005).
13
